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This paper aims at constructing a simple framework for discussing some issues of
globalization from an historical point of view. In taking this approach I should like to
acknowledge my indebtedness to the work of Professor Yoda Yoshiie who successfully
combines a rigid academic approach towards issues of historical periodization with the
comparative study of civilizations, in particular Japanese and Chinese civilizations･2
China, India, Indonesia, Japan and Korea constitute more than two Rfths of the
world's population, but the voice of their citizens remains muted in the "international
community". As a result of globalization, their civilizations may survive at the regional
level at best, if not destined to be relegated to folklore. More importantly, the attempt
by the Chinese Communist Party to maintain leadership into the future is seen by some
as a challenge to globalization. It is a question of vital importance whether Asia can
avoid a replay of the kind of polarization that triggered major wars during the past one
hundred and thirty years all over the globe. An historic perspective may aid us to
understand the tectonic shifts that produce major quakes such as wars.
As one of the many reactions to Western colonialism, and Western-led globalization,
scholars from many different parts of the globe presented attempts to introduce
paradigms of Western history to the study of non-Western history, including the
application of Western-derived paradigms such as "civilization" and "religion. In recent
years concepts such as "civil society" have been applied to the history or urbanization
of Ming China, and the popular literature of the preceding Mongol Yuan dynasty has
been given the label "citizen's literature". The application of paradigms of globalising
societies to the distant past of Chinese civilization is no more and no less than
subordinating Chinese history to the demands of globalising history, or else the mtegra-
tion and subordination of Chinese history into the genealogy of the globalization
paradigm.
Usually, colonialism and globalization are seen as threatening to the survival of
non-Western civilizations. The rise of a new discipline in Japan, "the study of civiliza-
tion" (bunmeigaku) may in part be explained as an attempt to establish the authenticity
and autonomy of the study of Japanese civilization. Such an approach must not be
interpreted as, and confused with narrow-minded "nationalism"-a label that is all too
often (and not always unthinkingly) applied to opponents, by those who regard them-
selves as representing a "universal" approach. Recently, demands have been made to
incorporate non-Western traditions into debates on International Relations theory, and
studies on defense.5　Any scholarly discussion of the globalization of social science
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disciplines requires grasp of scholarly debates of sheer unlimited size at a stage when
discussions even in any one limited負eld of a discipline have become so complex that
their complexity threatens to undermine our capability to communicate meaningfully
altogether.6 All too often concepts are used without referring to underlying assump-
tions which may or may not be shared by other participants in discussions. To give but
one example, terms such as Christian civilization, or Islamic civilization presume the
existence of a community of believers {umma) united in their belief of being bound to
one ultimate being (G'd), while such an assumption cannot apply to civilizations in India,
China (at least not to the non-Islamic civilizations in both countries), or Japan. De魚ni-
tions of civilizations are encumbered by the fact that the phenomenon "civilization" has
a chameleon-like quality-apparently able to change not just its appearance, but also its
quality m unpredictable fashions. At the same time, this has been a major reason for
widespread attempts to pin down the quasi-eternal, permanent "essentials" of civiliza-
tions.
The age of globalization is crowded with references to an (international) civil
society, or the international/global community, yet there is little global agreement on
its nature. Should the inhabitants of China, India, Indonesia, Brasil, Nigeria and Japan
agree on how to deal with a major issue, this implies the support of the majority of the
global population-it needs no comment that the major global media have a di庁erent
concept of the international, or global community. If nothing else, it seems that global
cooperation against terrorism seems to unite states and citizens against a common
enemy, at least for the time being.
The collapse of the Soviet Union has speeded up processes of globalization, promi-
nently driven by the leader of Western alliances, the United States. Globalization
processes are commonly identified with concepts such as market democracy (short for
market economics plus parliamentary democracy), the strengthening of civil society, and
specific values such as human rights. True to the character of an historic development
enveloping the globe, globalization is portrayed as having a universal character applica-
ble to all major civilizations of the twentieth and twenty薫rst century. Presented as an
irreversible phenomenon it appears to transcend borders that separate nations, states
and civilizations, if not subverting civilizations around the globe. Rather than building
on self-descriptions and deanitions provided by the actors this paper presents globaliza-
tion as just one stage in a development that on the one hand separates states and regions
into zones with an e魚cient social, economic and political order carried by core leaders
such as the US and some member states of the EU, while the remainder of the globe
attracts attention of global leaders mainly when that core order is threatened.9
The history of the twenty璃rst century tends to be seen as the history of globaliza-
tion that relegate岳the history of geographical regions and disparate civilizations to the
realm of local history.10 Its major achievement is the creation of sets of orders that
regulate relations between the individual, society and the state {civil society), the
behavior of companies kovernance), and set the standards for a global economic order
(symbolized in institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO). Lest there
be no misunderstanding: the order thus created rests on the shared acceptance of
institutionalized forms of rivalry and conflict that still require the exercise of military,
economic and political power.ll US alliances with European states (NATO) and alliances
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such as the US-Japan alliance are core elements to guarantee a global security order,
while ad hoc coalitions such as in the Gulf War, or the recent Afghanistan war are
merely temporary arrangements. Core alliances by far transcend tasks and functions
described in balance of power theories, and link member states in a semi-permanent
fashion that recalls the organization of afranchise enteゆrise. Its common product is the
spread of "globalization", a project covering the economic, political, military and social
order.12 Tendencies towards hierarchical patterns of order are strengthened by advances
in information technology which require instant decisions on the basis of welトguarded
information both at the levels of state and companies which obviate traditional forms of
participatory decision-making. Such phenomena are indications that labels of self-
descriptions such as "democracy" and "transparency" may conceal more than they
reveal. The essence of democracy is self-determination, but globalization appears to
narrow considerably the framework within which the individual may exercise his
(political) preferences. To some, globalization appears as an inevitable historical phe-
nomenon, to others the result of a Western conspiracy for world domination. To the
contemporary historian globalization presents the chance of a lifetime to grapple with
the question whether history has meaning at all. The collapse of the Soviet Union has
stimulated debates by historians on "globalization", leading the American Francis
Fukuyama to hail the end of history,13　while Frenchman Jean-Marie Guehenno an-
nounced the beginning of a new age, the "imperial age".14　To some Chinese writers
globalization is just another phase of Western colonialism.15
The definition of Western civilization
Like most other civilizations, Western civilization displays an extremely complex
structure comprising quite contradictory paradigms. Its dynamism does not derive
from consensus and homogeneity, but from incessant strife and battles. European and
American societies16　have always been deeply aware of the innate tension between
moral values and political expediency, the tensions that exist between "might and
･right". The penetration of continental Europe, the British Isles and Ireland by Christi-
anity contributed its own share of disputes: major themes in European history are deep
conflicts between claims to worldly political power by the Pope in Rome over Europe,
contested by secular as well as "protestant" forces.17
For reasons laid out below Western civilization is here deBned not in terms of
･western values", but as the rigorous application of mathematical models not just in the
natural sciences, but in all spheres of socialized human activities･ The French Revolu-
tion signaled the advent of a modernizing state engaging in scientific management of its
affairs, including large scale social engineering, and attempts to extend itself as a model
for the creation of other states, supported by military conquest and the establishment of
alliances to spread its model. The French-led "Confederation of the Rhine" (Rheinbund)
may thus be seen as the first beginnings of the globalization process.18 Globalization is
a true heir to the same Western tradition that also produced Marxism and Communism,
a western tradition that believes that not only nature, but the outcome of human
activities such as economics, politics and society as well can be rationally described in
agures, numeral equations, and mathematically phrased laws-a daring feat no other
civilization achieved.19　Modern market economics has gone a step further. It has
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applied the lessons of biological Darwinism to economic development. Market econom-
ics relies on a system, a set of rules designed to let only the fittest survive, and may
therefore be termed economic Darwinism. Market economics is advocated as the best
mechanism to select those companies most suited to promote progress, in a manner
evoking Darwinian thinking on the evolution of species, a game simulating processes of
natural evolution.20　This writer holds that advocating the (quasi) scientiBc manage一
merit of human affairs is a much more fundamental, and revolutionary concept than the
concept "capitalism" itself.21
As yet, there is no science ofglobalization to link phenomena in disparate 員elds in
one grand theory. Historians of the twenty竜rst century may feel a certain sense of
nostalgia towards Marxism, since post-Marxian historians were reluctant, if not unable
to develop theories that present the direction of historic change in terms of inevitable
and irreversible historical laws. This contrasts with widespread feelings, or assump-
tions that globalization is the result of irresistible developments.
The separation of moral precepts from demands of science-based development is a
hallmark of western style modernization, constantly challenging (and changing) re-
ceived values both in Western and non-Western civilizations. This author argues that
it is futile to look for absolute standards in deciding the question whether Western (or
any other civilization) should be deBned by reference to sets of basis of values, but up to
the historian to judge which approach is more appropriate in dealing with major
historical developments. From an early stage Japan appeared willing to go a long way
to meet this demand for separating moral injunctions and constructing a new surviv-
able society:
In this quest to emancipate thought from moral abstraction and to establish a
more鮎xible foundation for action, no man in the late Tokugawa period was better
prepared than Sakuma Shozan …　This is an early announcement of Sakuma's
disposition to separate morality from politics and history. … "However important
standards and laws have been in the past, they must be changed today", not just for
the Tokugawa family, but "for the welfare of the imperial line whose hundred
generations of unbroken succession are without comparison in the countries of the
world."22
As if shocked by the consequences of wholesale transformation numerous modern_
lzers attempted to re-introduce traditional moral values in one way or the other. Others,
disappointed by broken promises of modern beliefs, seek refuge in the culture of their
forefathers.23 Yoda Yoshiie has repeatedly pointed out that Japan tends to deal with
conflicting elements in its civilization by juxtaposing them in a kind of peaceful
coexistence-whereas in China, the tendency is to choose one alternative and discard the
other.24 This may in fact be a major, deep reason why Japan has been able to achieve
successful modernization: wholesale colonization is hardly likely to produce successful
modernization. The link between introducing novel techniques at the same time as
promoting a traditional community spirit is also evident among modernizing entrepre-
neurs.
As mentioned above, this writer holds that the dynamism of Western civilization
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that is producing globalization is basically due to the application of science based
models in all spheres of human activity. Needless to add, the application of rational
means and methods does not necessarily produce rational outcomes. Attempts by both
advocates and opponents of globalization to portray globalization as the spread of
"Western" values suffer from one-sided interpretations of Western civilization as it
developed since the end of the seventeenth century. A case in point is the use of the
term "civil society", which is in fact a value-loaded concept, rather than being a neutral
term for historic analysis. Di庁ering from traditional European, Scottish and English
concepts that placed the role of the natural individual in society in a central position,
modern "civil society" is highly institutionalized. Without access to institutions any one
individual can hardly hope to play a signiBcant role in non-government "civil society" 27
Another, not unrelated feature is the rise of globalized elites, which are far more
developed than attempts to construct an international space for domestic civil society.
Globalized elites are members of an epistemic community that shares the experience of
similar curricula of business and management schools world wide. In a way they
resemble elites of the Chinese empire, which relied on a numerically fairly small number
of elites that were systematically trained and socialized as supra-regional elites
("Confucianism", "examination system") to constitute an epistemic community engaged
in the management of local and supra-local affairs. The Chinese empire did not impose
one national language or uniform culture on the citizens of the empire, and adopted
d滑erent forms of taxation according to the economic structure of regions. It accepted
the widespread use of self-government both in the economy, moral education and even
parts of the criminal law. In this sense, the organization of the Chinese empire may
present an early paradigm of "globalized governance" that required only limited inputs
to impose centralized political rule, but left precious little space for the development of
"civil society". Last, but not least, values currently valid in any given society cannot
simply be derived from studies of the respective classics such as the Christian bible. US
popular culture is dominated by images of monsters and unknown dangers that have to
be overcome by brutal and un forgiving violence to achieve "infinite justice":28 invasions
by aliens, poltergeists, Frankenstein like monsters, or even the frequent portrayal of
violence in nature by symbols of threats such as sharks, crocodiles and dinosaurs belong
to this category.29 The interpretation of values inherent in popular culture is far from
easy: as one example I should like to refer to the di魚culties in interpreting the major
(cartoon) film hit in Japan in 2001, Sen to chihiro no kamikakushi ("Spirited Away )
which is not only brilliantly made, but takes up the theme of Japan s identity in a very
sophisticated way.30
Creating borders-zones of order, intermediate zones, and areas of benign (?) neglect
The establishment of systems of order is an uneven process that spreads order from
core regions. This process is not equivalent to the simple extension of "national power.
Globalization is no exception. If the age of the French Revolution is indeed a major
historical starting point of globalization we may regard the completion of systems of
colonial rule before the outbreak of the First World War as the second step, followed by
the qualitative acceleration of globalization processes towards the end of the twentieth
century. Separated by roughly one century, each of these turning points marked
-69-
Kurt W. Radtke
sigm負cant changes in the regions forming the object of penetration by core states. This
was accompanied by major changes in the manner in which political "communities
were constructed within the core states.
The French revolution provoked the rapid build up of modernizing nation states m
the rest of continental Europe. 1 Although British industrialization led the way,
numerous British institutions, including the British legal system and its peculiar form of
constitutionalism were too idiosyncratic to be considered transferable to the continent.
Colonialism took place in the context of rivalry among modernizing nation states.
Since religious communities (Catholicism, Protestantism) could no longer provide the
basic force for uniting societies, space was created for the growth of political creeds and
ideologies; in the second half of the nineteenth century this led to the gradual rise of
political parties as a mainstay in the political process of the European colonial powers.
The rise of political ideologies and parties proved a two-edged affair: it did not only
liberate the individual and gave him access to participation in the political process, it
also fostered the rise of Western-style totalitarianism (see below).
The internal modernization of colonizing powers was accompanied by imposition of
colonial rule in territories elsewhere. This resulted in drawing the borders for the vast
majority of nation states existing by the sixties of the twentieth century. Colonialism
did not normally spread modern patterns of order that would enable colonial territories
to achieve self-sustained modernization in areas such as the economy, politics and
society. By the same token, autonomous government, or the establishment of rival
regional systems or order were systematically thwarted. Changes were su氏ciently
serious to raise the issue of survival for non-Western civilizations. It is no accident that
the decades before the outbreak of the First World War saw the massive rise of debates
on the chances of survival of Chinese and Japanese civilizations in terms of a clash of
civilization32　resembling current debates of the consequences of globalization. Both
debates coincide with periods of systemic change not just of the global order, but
internal domestic order as well. In the age of globalization social and economic change
have made it di魚cult, if not impossible to employ traditional concepts of class structure
and social status as organizational foundations for the participation of individuals in
society. By the same token, "civil society" is becoming the preserve of professionals
working in specialised organizations such as NGOs. NGOs and NPO S are not necessa-
rily "private" institutions in the traditional sense of the word.33　The acceleration of
globalization in recent decades is accompanied by the demise of political parties based
on political convictions-new forms of institutionalized mediation of economic and
military competition are judged to be more efficient and appropriate.34
Globalization has drawn clear lines between areas of stable order in the Triad-
Europe, North America and Japan and the rest of the globe. Societies elsewhere have
few choices left: they either voluntarily accept modernization and its concomitant
separation of (traditional) values from the structure of modernizing states, or attempt to
construct rival orders, such as symbolized in the ascent of the pre-war Japanese Empire,
or the attempt to construct an autonomous regional order such as constituted by the
People's Republic of China. Both Japan and China adopted core elements of Western
style modernization, but both countries developed social systems that are not easily
identified with some of the main tenets of globalization. Nevertheless, Japan did not
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only succeed in modernizing materially, but also in introducing a stable political and
economic institutional framework along the lines of European constitutional states,
which was one of the conditions which made Western powers acknowledge Japan as
one pole in the Triad.
The period of colonialism seldom concluded with the successful restructuring of the
economic/social/political system of territories along the lines of Western powers.
Towards the end of the colonial age-roughly the sixties of the twentieth century-the
newly independent countries were basically judged along three criteria: their alignment
in the global Soviet-US competition, importance as markets (both as suppliers of raw
materials and buyers), and whether protracted instability might threaten strategic
interests of the core states. The collapse of the Soviet Union has not basically aだected
the latter two considerations. A huge part of the global population lives in societies in
Asia and Africa that usually achieve not much more than tenuous stability, marked
from time to time by eruptions of violence-wars, civil war, and economic chaos causing
damage that rivals or even exceeds the ravages of war. Active intervention m those
parts of the world in order to impose some kind of "globalising order" exceeds by far the
ability of core powers-how costly such undertakings are is shown by estimates for the
reconstruction of former Yugoslavia, or Afghanistan. Rather than provoking active
resistance towards Western intervention it seems to be judged wiser to deal with these
regions with (benign) neglect, unless major strategic interests dictate otherwise.35
The Third Reich and the Soviet Empire as products of Western Civilization
Both the rise of fascism and socialist totalitarianism in Europe are by now often
perceived to be aberrations from a European-Western civilization that is essentially
based on values such as innate human rights, or else Christian values. Mainstream
historians tend to ascribe the rise of the German genocidal state m terms unrelated to
Western civilization, citing unique features of the German people, if not a(n imagined)
German race.36 To do otherwise would raise fundamental questions about the assump-
tion that the West's civilization is founded in "Western values. However, communism,
modernizing fascism and capitalism display remarkable structural similarities which
suggest that they are indeed rooted in one and the same civilization.　They all
subscribe to the view that certain sociaトeconomic "core processes are the key engines
of historic progression and change: changes in the material bases engendering class
struggle, or else market mechanisms causing increasing division of labor. Even though
fascism stressed the god-like quality of its leadership rooted in traditions of the (racially)
de負ned groups it presented, fascism too endeavored to reconstruct society along the
material demands of modernization.
If not in theory, then in actual practice these approaches produced "leading states
that present themselves as the advance force of inevitable change-mainly the Soviet
Union and the United States. Propaganda preaches belief in the historical inevitability
of the global spread of one's system by voluntary or forcible conversion. The struggle
between "communism" and "capitalism was considered by both to be a global event
representing the負nal stage of the evolution of global history3 -there simply seemed to
exist no credible alternative to forms of organization derived from other than Western
civilization. The comparison between both systems may be carried further: coalitions
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led by the United States resemble the Communist "United Front" approach, and the
function of some institutions of "civil society" are not dissimilar to the role of "front
organizations" in disseminating political and social values in society at large.
Guarantors of the new global order-tile franchise system of Western alliances
The structure of the international order since World War II, dominated by alliance
systems, resembled the rivalry among two franchise enterprises: the Soviet one, and the
project later to be known as market democracy led by the United States. We may liken
the export of forms of organization in the political, cultural, social and economic sphere
to the spread of a network of franchise enterprises, not "owned" by company headquar-
ters, but bound to it in a complex set of relationships. Its relative stability is amongst
others due to the fact that membership promises stable returns on investments. With-
drawal of participation from the chain usually results in heavy losses of accumulated
investments. A franchise enterprise "thinks globally, and acts locally". It markets its
products m globally recognizable packages, but their contents are not always identical
with those produced elsewhere. Debates on particular policy issues ("discours") tend to
be structured by the pattern of the franchise headquarters, whatever the specific local
conditions. Scholars a魚Iiated with the culture of franchise headquarters carry greater
weight than those in the so-called "periphery", if for no other reason than that they can
actually influence decision making in W`ashington. Terms such as "good governance"
reflect the codes set by franchise headquarters.
The strength of the United States is often taken as proof of the superiority of its
"system -as historians are well aware, mono-causal explanations are hardly ever
sufficient, and what is appropriate to the physical environment of the United States may
be highly unsuitable elsewhere. Becoming the world's uncontested hegemon is pre-
sented as a consequence of adhering to "Western values". In turn, the material
superiority of the United States is easily linked to the claim that this also proves the
superiority of Western Civilization in general.
Globalization" has been called a political revolution brought about by business.39 If
so, it is a revolution or movement that cooperates with states and governments, rather
than opposing them. Interpreting globalization as the spread of "market plus some
democracy" seems an attractive proposition, since it is a form of democracy in which the
selection of the飢test relies heavily on the market place, yet in which political activities
are frequently regarded as improper interference in market mechanisms. "Globalization
means homogenization. Prices, products, wages, wealth, and rates of interest and pro翫
tend to become the same all over the world…　Under the protection of American
military power, globalization proceeds relentlessly."40 The United States often arrogates
the title, or is credited with being the model of a "market democracy". Serious analysis
would負rst of all require an awareness of interaction and conaict between the concepts
"market" and "democracy";41 once an analytical model is established, one needs to test
the usefulness of this model by applying it to the actual situation of the US. Unless this
is done, a term such as "market democracy" retains at most propaganda value.
Implications for the Theory of Ⅰnternational Relations
The core states underwriting a globalising order are more or less the same as the
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Western "great powers" of the past, now including Japan in an (as yet) minor role. The
core powers also pretend to represent the international community･ When the globalis-
ing order is seen threatened, members of core alliances assume leadership to restore
order, aided by more or less loose coalitions that include the largest possible number of
countries.42 In case the United Nations is unwilling to support policies of the core states,
it is THEIR international community, and not the members of the United Nations, that
seek to reestablish the threatened order.43 Globalized order is based on a clear distribu-
tion of tasks, division of labor and leadership, rather than on global consensus. The
hierarchical aspect is strengthened still further due to the need to speed up decision-
making in all areas of military activities, as well as in the economy, visible in particular
in負nancial markets. The question arises whether all these are inevitable historical
developments-it usually is in the interest of authority to deny the possibility of
alternatives, if for no other reason that the only alternative is "anarchy'.
In a sense, the Hfranchise" allegory resembles the phenomenon of "bandwagoning'
described in balance of power theories, yet franchising also entails a more complex
process of interaction in which states can no longer easily be conceptualized as inde-
pendent actors.44 Such systems of order tend to be hierarchically organized, rather than
re鮎cting deepening "democratization". A case in point is the implementation of plans
for a National and/or Theatre Missile Defense. It creates new forms of collective risk
management which need to be backed up by institutionalized intelligence sharing under
US leadership. Due to the short lead time in the age of the information revolution, it is
only the power at the center of the integrated system that can take decisions over
whether or not to take action against a perceived threat, possibly including preventive
strikes. The heavy emphasis on integration under US leadership in recently published
US long-term defense planning conBrms this tendency. This is also clearly expressed in
the explicit and implied visions for a united command structure under US leadership in
the document "Joint Vision 2020" recently issued by the US Department of Defense.
One of the results is a further strengthening of the division of labor that already exists
in the aeld of collective defense planning among the members of the Triad. It also
makes for deep asymmetries in the international order which cannot be expressed in
simple terms of balance of power among sovereign states. Indices of "comprehensive
national power" measuring individual states separately, common in the defense think-
ing in many countries, and still prevalent in Chinese analyses (zonghe guoli), are ill suited
to comprehend the combined cohesive strength of the franchise union.45 It seems futile
to attempt rescuing the axiom of the sovereign state as the basic actor unit as is done in
some mainstream theories of international relations.
Transmission of power has become a mediated, socialized, institutionalized process
led by core states, in which the exercise of power often becomes opaque. The high
degree of institutionalization has deeply affected processes of decision making. As
anybody who participated in decision making in committees is aware, the results of
such collective decision making frequently diだer from the intent of individual commit-
tee members. Neither does (rational) bargaining necessarily lead to rational decisions.
The qualitative increase of institutionalized cooperation among members of the Triad,
especially in defense and security matters, makes it highly questionable to apply the
human simile to state actors, as if the behavior of states followed the mechanisms of
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decision making by human individuals.
States excluded from this institutionalized process may Bnd that the only alterna-
tive to joining the process is by undermining it. Those powers tend to be categorized as
"rogue states", outcasts, countries to whom the courtesies of international rules need not
apply.46 This may also be due to deep doubts especially in the US whether non-Western
countries such as North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and others might not consider suicidal
attacks against the US, thus rendering the logic of mutual assured destruction useless in
the post-Cold War period.
Asian geopolitics
Regionalization in Europe and (Latin) America is proceeding steadily, even if the
Argentinean crisis has thrown a dark shadow over attempts to achieve autonomous
regionahzation in South America that avoids US leadership. Different from Europe,
countries with a history of colonization-and that includes the United States (!)-are clearly
averse to conceding part of their sovereignty. This partially explains the fact that
building a NATO-like structure in Asia seems virtually impossible. The US-Japan and
US-Korean alliances date from an era where Japan as the defeated aggressor nation was
not in a position to take sovereign decisions on the alliance, while the RoK had little
choice but to join hands with the US if it wanted to survive the attack by North Korea.
These alliances make it highly unlikely that Asia's giant countries-India, Russia and
China-will join hands to form a Eurasian triumvirate, since doing so would present an
essential challenge to the Triad, all the more so at a time when each of the three
Eurasian giants relies heavily on economic cooperation with Triad members. Moreover,
competition among Asian countries is strong. The recent accession of China and
Taiwan as members of the WTO is likely to increase competition not only within China,
but also among Asian nations as a whole.
East, Southeast, and South Asia belong to an intermediate zone that is in no position
to establish a regional order rivaling that of the Triad. On the other hand, the Triad is
deeply interested in preventing the loss of stability in that huge area which may
directly affect the welトbeing not only of Japan, but also the United States. The same is
also true for the continental Asian giants, binding them loosely in a mechanism that I
termed Mutual Assured Instability (MAI). While engaged in mutual competition
members are aware that any major destabilization of one of its members would
seriously threaten their own welfare, if not stability.47 Having said that it would be an
illusion to regard Asia as an integral part of a globalising system.48
It is important to note that policy debates within Japan, South Korea, or debates in
Taiwan and Southeast Asia do not necessarily follow the frameworks set in Washing-
ton, nor do countries and societies in modern East Asia share a similar system of values
that would make Chinese, Indian, Korean, or Japanese leadership acceptable to their
partners in Asia. A similar system of values is essential in persuading cooperating
partners that the country exercising leadership will take decisions on their behalf
compatible with their own long term strategies. In fact, there is little agreement both
within Asia or among observers from the US or the EU about the character of domestic
political and economic systems in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other parts of Asia.
Japan s economy is said to deviate from a "genuine" market economy, South Korea,
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Indonesia and other countries are accused of "crony capitalism". Few non-Asian
scholars seem convinced that any Asian country (including India) is a "genuine
democracy (no matter how that term is deaned). Foreign and military security policies
of Asian actors are habitually analyzed in terms linking them to systemic, European
derived categories of "democracy", "totalitarian dictatorships", and "communism. Op-
position to policies of the Triad is quickly labeled "nationalism" as a means to delegiti-
mize such opposition. Especially among members of the Republican Party in the US the
tendency is strong to transfer images of the Communist Soviet Union to the People s
Republic of China, using concepts ill suited to account for changes since 1980. The
United States and, to a lesser extent, Europe, export political models to Asia, but hesitate
to grant the necessary certificates of acknowledgement to their Asian franchise takers.
Scholars and politicians in the Triad share serious doubts whether China's transi-
tion to a "socialist market economy" signiBes a break with communist one-party
dictatorship, despite the imposition of international "regimes" such as those represented
by the WTO. Since rules of international regimes are likely to be determined by the
stronger parties this has caused quite a few scholars and politicians in non-Western
countries to view globalization processes in terms of "new colonialism".49 With tongue
in cheek we might call globalization "high-tech colonialism", or "the highest stage in the
development of market democracy". Chinese government o魚cials have expressed
hopes that China's accession to the WTO will also allow China to have a greater say m
the construction of a global order. Needless to add, the inclusion of China will also
contribute to greater competition among countries of the "third world" whose interests
do not automatically converge.
Asian divergence from Western models is not due to the existence of a common
Asian civilization. Above I posited that the core of Western civilization is a strong
emphasis on the systematic application of mathematical forms of management through-
out society. Just as countries in Europe and the Americas respond d滑erently to these
exigencies, so we notice that countries throughout Asia develop their own "version'of
these models.
In an ironic twist of history, Miyazawa and Koosaka argued that Japanese foreign
policy until 1970 did not follow moral guidelines, but that from 1979 Japan stressed the
importance of shared values with the United States･50 Rather than expressing a genuine
qualitative change in independent Japanese policy making it rather points to a strength-
ening of the links with the United States in terms of the franchise alliance model
referred to above. Others, such as Takasaki Tatsunosuke, would emphasize a common-
ality of values in East Asia (tooyoo dootoku). More recently, Masato Kimura and David
Welch have addressed the issue of reconciling theories about national interest with
observable behaviour of Japanese foreign policy which does not seem to conform to
common wisdom.52
At the present stage the US does not have an overall strategy which would enable
it to impose leadership on integration processes in Asia-one might even suspect that it
may not be in the US interest to support such a development.53
Although this paper maintains that the alliances linking the Triad under US
leadership are extremely stable this does not necessarily imply congruence of global
interests of its partners. The US has never been willing to accept the EU, or individual
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European states as genuine partners in constructing a system of (c0-operative) security
in the Middle East.54 This may be compared to the unwillingness of the US to grant
Japan a genuine role in deliberations on the Korean issue. Japan was not represented in
the Four Party Talks-it was strong Japanese reactions towards the firing of the Taepo-
dong rocket that forced the US to grant Japan limited involvement by establishing the
US-ROK-Japan Trilateral C0-ordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in 1999.
The average Japanese seems unwilling to see Japan become involved in a hot war
against China, should the US and China clash over Taiwan. The governments of South
Korea and Japan are said to have adopted a negative attitude when the US considered
military attacks against North Korea during the crisis of 1994. Asian nations do not
always appear overly enthusiastic in their support of other US led initiatives, and that
includes the formal allies of the US. The Bush administration provides only lukewarm,
if any, support to Kim Daejung's opening towards North Korea. In other words, in Asia
the system of US-led alliances does not by itself create a coherent body politic.
China-US relations and Japan's function in Asia
There are signs that the new Bush administration is considering an active "roll
back policy towards what they term the dictatorships in China and North Korea. The
United States considers a China-supported "regionalization" of East Asia as a road
towards regional autonomy that reduces the role of the US in the region. Increasing the
strength of US led-alliance systems is seen as one way to ensure continued US involve-
merit. Conceptualizing systemic order in terms of balance of power is likely to end in an
arms race with an uncertain魚nish. Any attempt to bankrupt China along the lines of
the Soviet collapse is likely to engender far greater instability in the whole of Eurasia
than brought about by the ending of the Soviet empire. An awareness of mutual
assured instability may induce common sense in the strategic thinking of all states
concerned.
In this age of globalization, Japan finds itself in the position of a "frontier state", a
stable member of the Triad, but itself not in a position to project Triadic order onto the
Asian mainland. Japan prefers to use its still enormous economic power to contribute
towards stability in Asia, without giving the appearance of acting in an unwelcome
"leadership role". Japan's initiatives to achieve a swap agreement among the ASEAN-
Ten plus China, the RoK and Japan are one part of this strategy. While cooperation
among Asian countries exist, competition within the region remains strong, as eヽ小
denced by the competitive bidding of China and Japan for the establishment of Free
Trade Zones with Southeast Asia. Globalization processes in Asia are most constructive
when they contribute to the institutionalization of peaceful competition, rather than
attempting to impose leadership. Such a "limited" role for globalization should not be
evaluated negatively･ Globalization and regionalism are not expressions of democratic
ideals. Operating under the aegis of national treasuries, politically motivated manipula-
tion of interest rates, and speculation by institutional and other investors against short
and long term market flows are characterized by anything but openness. Neither the US
Treasury, nor the IMF, World Bank and relevant European institutions are known for
transparency or democratic decision making. The equal application of the same rules,
whether those of the WTO or in other international regimes, is likely to favor the
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stronger partner, rather than protecting the weaker ones. In the face of global or
regional competition, and the need to survive economically, international cooperation is
the only option for smaller economies or countries. It is highly unlikely that the ideals
of regionalism would su魚ce to integrate the weaker members voluntarily without the
leadership of the strongest nation states, Germany, France and Great Britain m Europe,
and the US in the Americas. Security threats, and political and military interventions
have all played significant roles in strengthening cohesion. Commonality of values was
not the main motive power for regional integration, but mitigates the risks for weaker
and small countries when accepting leadership of stronger states.
Since leadership by any one country is not an option in and for Asia, the evolving
structure of the geopolitical order in Asia must necessarily d滑er from that of Europe
and the Americas. Absence of "leadership" does not equal anarchy. Any attempt to
impose one-sided leadership is likely to foster polarization, with little promise of
increased stability.
Seen from this perspective, the history of globalization remains as open-ended as
history has always been. Couching world history in terms of the slogans of globaliza-
tion is unlikely to deliver a lasting analytical framework･
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